In this paper*, I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle on the question of truth (ἀλήθεια).
Heidegger famously claims that a transformation of the essence of truth happens in Plato (GA 34;
GA 36/37; GA 9, 203-38 but also in GA 54). This transformation is a shift from an “original”
conception of truth as disclosedness (Unverborgenheit, ἀλήθεια) to a derivative and narrower
conception of truth as correctness (Richtigkeit, ὀρθότης), initially the correctness of a seeing and
eventually the correctness of a judgement or assertion, namely its “correspondence” (Angemessenheit)
with “what is the case.” Now if that transformation from an “alethic” to an “orthotic”
understanding of truth really occurs in Plato, one would expect the prevalence of the “orthotic”
view to be visible to an even greater extent in Aristotle. Yet, Heidegger clearly sees instances in
Aristotle’s texts where ἀλήθεια is not understood through the orthotic paradigm.
If we ask Heidegger the straightforward question “does the alethic understanding of truth get
supplanted by its orthotic counterpart in Aristotle?”, we do not get a straightforward answer. In
fact, Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle on the question of truth are ambivalent. While at many
places, Heidegger claims that Aristotle understands truth as correctness (Richtigkeit) instead of
disclosedness (Unverborgenheit), I show that he is extremely reluctant to straightforwardly ascribe this
view to the Stagirite: Heidegger also shows throughout three decades of interpretation an
appreciation of Aristotle’s recognition that truth is primarily disclosedness, ἀ-λήθεια. As I shall
argue here, these interpretations vary according to two factors: 1) the specific Aristotelian text at
issue, and (most importantly) 2) the purpose or function of Heidegger’s specific discussions of
Aristotle on truth in their context. This ambivalence has hardly been noticed by scholars, as the
relevant literature on the topic almost exclusively deals with one text isolated from others.
Against the natural temptation to construct a developmentalist account of Heidegger’s position
on the question of truth in Aristotle, I shall propose a “functionalist” reading. To do so, I show that
the most decisive factor is the function of each interpretation of Aristotle in the textual context of
Heidegger’s work. I think we can distinguish broadly between two different aims or functions and
corresponding interpretations: when Heidegger is performing an actual Destruktion of Aristotle and
closely engaging with the texts, he usually defends the view that Aristotle understood truth as
disclosedness; when Heidegger is situating Aristotle in a broader historical narrative concerning
the transformation of the essence of truth in the history of Being, we find him defending the view
that Aristotle’s philosophy – especially his De Interpretatione – is the locus classicus of the orthotic
understanding of truth in the West. While it is true that the second of these two aims seem more
prominent from the 1930s onward, he defends the disclosedness reading in 1939 (GA 9, 301), 1944
(GA 83, 436) and 1951/52 (GA 83, 596-97). This should show that temporal development is not a
solution to the ambivalence of Heidegger’s confrontation with Aristotle on the question of truth: a
functionalist reading answers the question better.

*This paper is a section of a book chapter on Heidegger’s Destruktion of Aristotle. The book (in-progress) is on
Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Aristotelianism.