Intrinsic Validity and the Permissiveness Problem
Colloquium
Speaker: John Taber, The University of New Mexico
Start: Mar 06, 2026 - 03:30pm
Where: MITCH 102
Description:
The theory of intrinsic validity is an influential theory of epistemic justification in Indian philosophy. It was introduced in the seventh-century C.E. by the great Mīmāṃsā philosopher Bhaṭṭa Kumārila. According to this theory, a cognition is valid unless and until it is overturned by another cognition, specifically, one that either ascertains that the cause of the cognition in question is defective or determines that matters are really different from how it represents them as being. Kumārila boldly employed this theory in attempting to prove the truth of the Vedic scriptures—in a manner that shall be explained. (His proof turns on the idea that the Veda is an authorless discourse and the claim that the falsehood of a text can only derive from some defect or shortcoming of its author.) In this talk I critically examine the theory of intrinsic validity in light of a theory from modern epistemology known as Phenomenal Conservatism that has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. The Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism states that “If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S is prima facie justified in believing that P.” I attempt to show that the two theories are at least analogous. Then I consider how some of the criticisms leveled against Phenomenal Conservatism might also apply mutatis mutandis to the theory of intrinsic validity. I conclude that both theories are vulnerable to what is called the permissiveness problem: they allow for people to be justified in holding absurd, even outrageous, beliefs, provided they just appear true to them and are unfalsifiable. Ultimately, I maintain, Kumārila’s defense of the truth of the Veda fails.